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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 20040969-CA 
vs. 
GARY RANDALL WHETTON, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for ten counts of Communications Fraud, second-
degree felonies, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801 (West 2004), and three 
counts of Unlawful Dealing by a Fiduciary, second-degree felonies, in violation of 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-513(2) (West 2004), in the Third District Court, the Honorable 
Scott M. Hadley presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2003). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court correctly interpret the "Concurrent or Consecutive 
Sentences" Statute to allow for multiple consecutive one-to-fifteen year sentences, 
where the statute specifically authorizes the trial court to sentence defendant to 
multiple consecutive one-to-fifteen year sentences? 
Defendant made no timely objection to the trial court's sentence or imposition of 
consecutive terms. Because defendant has not argued plain error or ineffective assistance 
of counsel, and in fact invited any error the trial court may have made, his claim may not 
now be reviewed. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (declining 
to review claim of unpreserved error absent request for plain error review); see also State 
v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 718 (Utah App. 1997). 
Had defendant properly preserved the argument for appeal, this Court would review 
the trial court's application of the statute in question for correctness. State v. Ostler, 2001 
UT 68, Tf 5, 31 P.3d 528. Although defendant argues that the standard of review is one of 
abuse of discretion, Br. Aplt. at 2, the issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly 
interpreted the statute in question. Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of 
law reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's interpretation. 
Pearson v. Lamb, 2005 UT App 383, f 5, 534 Utah Adv. Rep. 9. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The full text of Utah Const. Art. 7, § 12 and UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-401, as cited 
in the body of this brief, is included in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 18, 2003, defendant was charged by Information with twenty counts of 
Communications Fraud, second degree felonies, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
10-1801 (West 2004), two counts of Issuing a Bad Check, second degree felonies, in 
2 
vi( .iatioii * i . \a CODE ANN. § 76-6-505(2) (West 2004), and nine counts of Unlawful 
t ,t Fiduciary, second degree felonies, in \ iolation of UTAH CODE 
\w v " ^ N v r- ^ i i ( i 4 ) k i n 1 1 i n i • ' . . ' 
On August 10,2004 defendant r!ed miiln • ••• 1 \ L S V C : L - • R 
1 c\ 1 ^? At sentencing, the State recommended that the court impose three consecu? •.-
sentences of one-to-fifteen years. R. 244: 20. The court inquired as to whether it was 
: i . .* i" • :«'c* / •-i « H-^c an, e one-to-fifteen years pursuant %> 
§ 76-3-401(0). k . 244: 21. After some discussion regarding restitution a; • ie 
court, the prosecutor, and defense counsel discussed the interpretation of that s1;il "iile HH 1 
came to a consensus as to the practical effect of the statute, R. 244: 24-28. The court 
ruled th;it regardless ol flic Mciilence imposed, the statuk nm.^ die Board of Pardons and 
Parole ("Board") to incarcerating defen I - * • ,: -. -i, . v 
Defense counsel responded to this interpretation by stating "Your Honor in my reading, 
I believe you're reading it correctly " "R 244: 28. The Court then requested the State's 
itipnl, and the Sl.ih- i. onuirml v . • .:.- : •;;.; 's understanding as well. R. 244; 28. 
After this discussion, the State ree»MU'n.^ ..li ^ ; • . ,
 ;,-u. .JCIUK a.., to 
three consecutive one-to-fifteen terms, and allow the Board to detemiine the actual length 
o" >L,:.ie:ice, wi,;. n.iv. .^ iniuied to a maximum of ^0 \ears pursuant to the statute. 
P • ,^ -
 : • ••• . .,..., ., : »,r. fining else liom the defense?" and the 
defense responded, " No, \ our Hor 
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After hearing from both the State and the defense as to what they believed was a 
proportionate sentence to the crimes pled, R. 244: 31-32, the court sentenced defendant 
to 13 indeterminate terms of one-to-fifteen years and ordered him to pay restitution. R. 
244: 33. Counts one through six were run consecutively; the remaining counts were run 
concurrently. R. 244: 33. The court stated, "In my mind, that would be a minimum 
sentence then of six years, maximum of 30 years." R. 244: 33. 
At the end of the sentencing hearing, the court again requested if there was anything 
else from the State or defense. R. 244: 36. The only issue the defense inquired into at 
that time was whether defendant should be given credit for time served. R. 244: 36-37. 
The court stated that he should be given credit for time served. R. 244: 37. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
Counts 1 through 12 
The Nordic Valley Ski Resort was owned by a company called Ski Associates. 
R.243:23. Nordic Valley had been for sale for several years when, in November, 2001, 
defendant approached the board of Ski Associates and tendered a check for $4.5 million 
in attempt to purchase Nordic Valley Ski Resort. R.243:28. The Ski Associates Board 
1
 Defendant pled guilty after a partial preliminary hearing. Evidence was presented on 
counts 1 through 15, but not on counts 16 through 31, for which defendant waived a 
preliminary hearing. See R.243:120. Accordingly, with respect to counts 1 through 15, 
this Statement of Facts relies on evidence presented at the preliminary hearing; with 
respect to counts 16 through 31, this Statement of Facts relies on the prosecutor's factual 
representations in his opening statement at the preliminary hearing. 
4 
accepted defendant's offer and scheduled a closing for the end of December 2001. 
1 •»'! r tin.1 purchase agreement, Ski Associates was to keep all proceeds generated 
by Nordic Valley through December 2001.R.2 ! • • *• ] .'o«.'\ dclon 
become the manager of N ordic Valley and receive of all revenue generated by the business 
on and alter that date. R.243.SS. 
( • -" - I hj'i'ciiilxi" Mi-, ?J i . IK.^IV-.: i\a> G. McNeely, who is on 
the board of Ski Associates, and explained that hi I I, i postpone clui.nig, unlil 
January 14, 2002 due to a delay in receiving the funding he needed to make the $4 S 
million payinenl. K „ M J ; J 3 J4 , (Jit January 13, defendant again contacted McNeely to 
po^tro- ::*- • . - ' • • • •* - . - . i •- ieiuiaiu dialed Uiat /jon's liaul: wis 
refusing to release any of his "38 to 40 million" J Mais- I'm 11 n- i (using, k24,v34. 
Defendant never had an account with Zion' s bank, and never owned $33 million. R.243:8. 
Nev cithcless, defendant delayed closing a third time and wrote out several checks 
to the stocl io» ! • < i — ••. eikiain ICIKICICLK !,^^ks on January 
18, 2002, but they were post dated to February 25, 2002. R. "-H — ^ 'Mend:--.- • -r 
end u^bc. R.243:0-10. McNeely attempted to call to veri fy existence of funds whenever 
delVi-d • •- .us K : :.: • aiv , ; ;i . stockholders. R.243:41-43. Defendant failed 
to provide funds sufficient to tin am« nun irndetvd on 'im I'IIIIC checks, and as aresi lltthe 
third closing did not occur. R.243:439. Nevertheless, during *' ' ' A'» - : f 
5 
2002, defendant kept all proceeds that were generated by Nordic Valley. R.243:33. 
Moreover, defendant failed to pay thousands of dollars worth of billing incurred during 
this time. R.243:38-40. Counts one through twelve are related to defendant's activities 
with Nordic Valley. R.243:9. 
Counts 13 and 14 
Also about this time, defendant hired McNeely to do computer work on a contract 
basis. R.243:51-52. Defendant wrote McNeely a check for $100,000 (as partial payment 
for services). R.243:52. This check was returned for insufficient funds. R. 243:53. Counts 
thirteen and fourteen, Communications Fraud and Issuing a Bad Check, concern these 
transactions. R. 243:10. 
Count 15 
While operating Nordic Valley, defendant engaged Jack Johnson Company 
("Company") to develop and expand the ski resort. R.243:103-04. The Company 
completed approximately $600,000 worth of services and development. R.243:112. 
Defendant gave the Company a check for $97,500 that was returned due to insufficient 
funds. R. 243:113. Count fifteen of the Information concerns these activities. 
Counts 16 through 31 
The remaining counts concern events that occurred about the same time as the 
aforementioned events. R. 243:11 -12,244:16. Defendant was soliciting investors for an 
Internet company named "Play-It." R. 243:13-15. He received approximately $487,000 
6 
in investment money, which he spent on purchases unrelated to Play-It. R. 243:16. In 
August, 2002, defendant produced a licensing agreement between Play-It and Cyber Link 
Systems, which he represented to be a subsidiary of Direct TV. Direct TV does not have 
a subsidiary called Cyber Link Systems, and the licensing agreement was fabricated by 
defendant R. 243:16. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant challenges the trial court's decision to run his sentences consecutively. 
In effect he argues that the trial court erroneously interpreted the statute limiting the time 
an inmate can serve to 30 years. However, defendant invited any error by concurring 
below with the trial judge's interpretation of the consecutive sentence statute. 
Consequently, even if the court committed plain error, which it did not, defendant cannot 
press his claim on appeal. 
Even if defendant had not invited the court's ruling below, his argument would fail. 
His claim that the imposition of six indeterminate terms of one-to-fifteen equates to a 
possible 90 years in prison is incorrect. Under the sentencing statute, the imposition of 
six consecutive one-to-fifteen year terms cannot result in defendant's actually serving 
more than thirty years. 
Defendant also argues that the broad discretion given to the Board allows it to 
ignore the sentencing statute. The Board has no such authority. It is bound by the Utah 
7 
Constitution and statutory law which limits its authority. As a result, the Board has no 
authority to hold defendant more than thirty years. 
Lastly, defendant urges this Court to overrule its own prior case law on the ground 
that the sentencing statute is ambiguous. On the contrary, the statute is clear and 
unambiguous and this Court has correctly interpreted the statute in its prior opinions. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT SENTENCED 
DEFENDANT TO SIX CONSECUTIVE ONE-TO-FIFTEEN YEAR 
TERMS. 
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly interpreted UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
3-401 (West 2004) by sentencing him to more than two consecutive one-to-fifteen year 
terms. Br. Aplt. at 12-13. Specifically, defendant asserts that a trial court is limited to 
sentencing any defendant who is not eligible for a life sentence to two one-to-fifteen year 
terms, since any more would exceed the thirty-year statutory maximum. Br. Aplt. at 13. 
Defendant also asserts that since the Board has "exclusive authority" to determine 
how long any given individual will actually serve in prison, it is possible that an individual 
could serve longer than thirty years in prison if the sentence imposed exceeds thirty years, 
despite the statute's 30-year limit on the maximum term served. Br. Aplt. at 13, 15. 
Finally, defendant urges this Court "to overrule its own prior case law." Br. Aplt. 
at 16. 
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A* Defendant Invited Any Error in the Trial Court's Imposition of 
Consecutive Terms. 
Where defense counsel affirmatively waives an objection below, the appellate court 
will decline to address that argument on appeal. State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 718 (Utah 
App. 1997) (addressing defense counsel's statement that he had no objection to the jury 
seeing a videotape of interview with child sexual abuse victim). Affirmative waiver is 
one form of invited error. A party cannot raise a claim on appeal where the party, through 
counsel, consciously refrained from objecting or led the trial court into error below. State 
v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989). Moreover, "where invited error butts up 
against manifest injustice [or plain error], the invited error rule prevails." State v. Perdue, 
813 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah App. 1991). 
Here, defendant's statement of preservation is as follows: "The issue was preserved 
when Defendant's attorney asked the trial judge to sentence defendant to two consecutive 
sentences." Br. Aplt. at 2. However, after the defense requested the trial court to sentence 
defendant to two consecutive sentences, the trial judge, the prosecution, and the defense 
counsel all discussed the sentencing statute and achieved a consensus as to its 
interpretation. When the court interpreted the statute as authorizing it to sentence 
defendant to consecutive terms exceeding 30 years, the court asked defense counsel 
whether he had anything further to say about that interpretation. R. 244: 31. Defense 
counsel responded, "No, your Honor." R. 244: 31. Thus, defendant acquiesced in the trial 
9 
court's interpretation and application of the statute. Any possible error was accordingly 
invited. This Court should accordingly reject the claim on appeal. 
B. The Trial Court's Interpretation of the Statute was Correct When 
it Found that it was Authorized to Sentence Defendant to Multiple 
Consecutive One-to-Fifteen Year Terms. 
In any event, the trial court's interpretation of the statute is correct. Although 
defendant argues that the standard of review is one of abuse of discretion, Br. Aplt. at 2, 
the sole issue is whether the trial court properly interpreted the statute in question. 
Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law reviewed for correctness, giving 
no deference to the trial court's interpretation. Pearson v. Lamb, 2005 UT App 383, f 5, 
534 Utah Adv. Rep. 9. 
Section 76-3-40l(8)(a) applies to sentences other than death or life imprisonment. 
It limits the Board of Pardons and Paroles in cases where the aggregate maximum term 
of consecutive sentences exceeds thirty years: "if the aggregate maximum term exceeds 
the 30-year limitation, then the maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years." In order 
to make legislative intent abundantly clear, the statute goes on to provide that: "[t]his 
section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual consecutive 
sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so imposed, but 
only to limit the length of sentences actually served under the commitments." UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-3-401(10) (West 2004). 
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The statutory intent and operation are clear. Once the court imposes consecutive 
sentences (which may exceed thirty years in maximum terms), a defendant may not 
actually be incarcerated by the Board for more than thirty years. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
3-401(6)(a) (West 2004). Therefore, while a trial court may sentence a defendant to any 
number of multiple consecutive sentences of one-to-fifteen years, the actual time of 
incarceration imposed by the Board may not exceed thirty years. 
The trial court understood the practical effect of the statute when it sentenced 
defendant to six consecutive sentences of one-to-fifteen years. It stated, "In my mind, that 
would be a minimum sentence then of six years, maximum 30 years." R. 244: 33. The 
prosecution further reiterated this point: "Your Honor, I think the way . . . this ought to 
be sentenced is you sentence [defendant] to three 1 to 15s consecutive and let the Board 
make a determination as to how the statute is applied. You don't need to say 3 to 30. You 
say three consecutive 1 to 15s." R. 244:31. Defendant concurred with this interpretation. 
&>e R. 244: 31. 
Defendant has not attacked the sentence as disproportionate or illegal except insofar 
as he claims it violates the 30-year statutory limit. Because the trial court's interpretation 
of the statute was correct, defendant's claim fails on the merits. 
11 
C. The Board of Pardons and Parole Lacks Discretion to Incarcerate 
a Felon for More Than Thirty Years When the Sentence Imposed 
is Six One-to-Fifteen Year Terms. 
Defendant asserts that the statute does not limit the Board's discretion as to how 
long it may incarcerate any given prisoner. Br. Aplt. at 13. He argues that the Board has 
unfettered discretion to determine how long an individual will actually serve in prison. 
Br. Aplt. at 14. This claim also fails. 
Under Utah's sentencing regimen, the court sentences a defendant to an 
indeterminate statutory sentence, but the Board of Pardons determines the actual length 
of time served. Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah 1994). Although the Board 
has wide discretion to determine an individual's length of incarceration, that discretion is 
limited by the Utah Constitution and by statute. See UTAH CONST. Art. 7. § 12. 
According to the Constitution, the Board has discretion to "grant parole, remit fines, 
forfeitures, restitution orders, commute punishments, and grant pardons subject to 
regulations as provided by statute." Id. at §12(2)(a) (emphasis added). Thus, 
notwithstanding the Board's authority to determine defendant's actual time of 
incarceration, its authority is limited by statute. Consequently, the Board may not 
incarcerate an individual longer than the prescribed statutory period—in this case, 30 
years. Despite defendant's assertion that the Board has broad discretion, there is no 
indication that the Board will defy statutory law by holding defendant more than thirty 
years as defendant speculates. 
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Defendant cites case law indicating that the Board has wide authority. Preece v. 
House, 886 P.2d 508 (Utah 1994); State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985). 
Nevertheless, neither case deals with the issue at hand. Preece held that the Board may 
extend a prisoner's period of incarceration so long as it falls within the statutory range. 
Preece, 886 P.2d at 512. Schreuder held that a trial court is not authorized to reduce a 
defendant's sentence to give credit for time served once the sentence has already been 
imposed—at that time, the Board has such authority. Schreuder, 712 P.2d at 277. Neither 
case applies to the instant case, where the Board's authority is specifically limited by 
statute. 
D. This Court has Correctly Determined this Issue Twice Before and 
Should Decline Defendant's Invitation to Overrule its Own Prior 
Case Law, 
In State v. Horton, this Court held that section 76-3-401 does not preclude a trial 
court from imposing consecutive sentences, but rather is a limitation on the Board of 
Pardons and Parole and simply operates to limit the amount of time a prisoner can actually 
serve for consecutive sentences. State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 715 (Utah App. 1993); 
see also State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 115, 120 (Utah App. 1993) ("[t]his construction of the 
statute is consistent with the purpose of a statute limiting consecutive sentences, which is 
to guard against oppressive and inequitably long sentences."). In bothHorton and Swapp, 
this Court held that the limitation of the statute does not preclude the trial court from 
imposing consecutive sentences totaling more than 30 years; rather, it prevents the Board 
13 
from actually holding a prisoner for more than 30 yezrsHorton, 848 P.2d at 715, Swapp, 
808 P.2d at 121-22. 
Although the trial court in Swapp correctly interpreted the sentencing statute and its 
interpretation was upheld on appeal, section 76-3-401 was changed as a result of some 
confusion in the Swapp sentencing hearing as to whether the trial court was limited to two 
consecutive one-to-fifteen year terms. The 1989 amendment to the statute clarified the 
intent of the Legislature, expressly providing that it does not limit the trial judge's 
imposition of sentence to only two consecutive one-to-fifteen year terms. S.B. 212, 48th 
Leg., Gen. Session, 1989 Utah Laws 181. 
In essence, defendant is not only requesting that this Court overrule its own long 
established precedent, he is additionally asking this Court to disregard the statute's plain 
language and clear legislative intent. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
Oral argument would not significantly aid the Court in deciding this case. Because 
this case raises no novel question of law, a published opinion would make no useful 
addition to the body of Utah law. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, defendant's consecutive terms of incarceration should be 
affirmed. 
14 
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Utah Code Ann. Sec. 76-3-401. 
[Concurrent or consecutive sentences - Limitations — Definition] 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one 
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. 
The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any 
other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the 
court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of 
victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later 
offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, unless the court 
finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences are to 
run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall request 
clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter a clarified 
order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single 
criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all 
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under 
Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(I) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a 
maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs 
after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were committed 
prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing 
court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to 
the present offense did not occur after his initial sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of 
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of 
Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a 
single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum 
sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, 
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the 
other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the longer 
remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual 
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so 
imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose 
consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a secure 
correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated 
or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the person is located. 
Utah Const. Art. 7 Sec. 12. 
[Board of Pardons and Parole—Appointment—Powers and procedures— Governor's 
powers and duties—Legislature's powers] 
(1) There is created a Board of Pardons and Parole. The Governor shall appoint the members of 
the board with the consent of the Senate. The terms of office shall be as provided by statute. 
(2)(a) The Board of Pardons and Parole, by majority vote and upon other conditions as provided 
by statute, may grant parole, remit fines, forfeitures, and restitution orders, commute 
punishments, and grant pardons after convictions, in all cases except treason and 
impeachments, subject to regulations as provided by statute. 
1. (b) A fine, forfeiture, or restitution order may not be remitted and a commutation, parole, or 
pardon may not be granted except after a full hearing before the board, in open session, and 
after previous notice of the time and place of the hearing has been given. 
(c) The proceedings and decisions of the board, the reasons therefor in each case, and the 
dissent of any member who may disagree shall be recorded and filed as provided by statute with 
all papers used upon the hearing. 
(3)(a) The Governor may grant respites or reprieves in all cases of convictions for 
offenses against the state except treason or conviction on impeachment. These respites 
or reprieves may not extend beyond the next session of the board. At that session, the 
board shall continue or determine the respite or reprieve, commute the punishment, or 
pardon the offense as provided in this section. 
(b) In case of conviction for treason, the Governor may suspend execution of the 
sentence until the case is reported to the Legislature at its next annual general session, 
when the Legislature shall pardon or commute the sentence, or direct its execution. If 
the Legislature takes no action on the case before adjournment of that session, the 
sentence shall be executed. 
Laws 1979, S.J.R. 7; Laws 1992, S.J.R. 8, § 6, adopted at election Nov. 3, 1992, eff. 
Jan. 1993. 
